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Route Aggregation (RA), the method to supersede a set of
routes by a single, more general route, is a fundamental mech-
anism to the Internet scalability. Yet, despite its importance,
it is poorly understood. We present the first systematic anal-
ysis of RA via both bottom-up experimental and top-down
analytical approaches. We first conduct a set of experiments
on RA behaviors of all major routing protocols as imple-
mented by the two leading router vendors. Our experiments
show that the RA behaviors vary significantly across routing
protocols and vendors. We propose two router level prim-
itives and incorporate them into a canonical router model.
The new model captures the diversity of the observed be-
haviors. With aid of the model, we have advanced the fun-
damental understanding of RA on three fronts. First, we
expose four new types of routing anomaly that can derive
from RA. Configuring RA on one router interface can in-
fluence how routes are advertised on other interfaces of the
same router, impacting network reachability in surprising
ways. Second, we demonstrate that determining whether a
RA configuration can result in persistent forwarding loops
is NP-complete. Finally, we present sufficient conditions for
RA primitives to guarantee routing safety, and explore clean-
slate designs for RA.
1. INTRODUCTION
Routing scalability is a major concern of the Internet rout-
ing system [25]. Route aggregation has played a critical role
towards containing this problem so far. Also known as route
summarization, route aggregation is a router mechanism that
generates a summary route from a set of child routes falling
under a common parent prefix and advertises the single sum-
mary route in lieu of announcing all the child routes. It al-
lows routers to handle fewer prefixes and has been crucial in
curbing the routing table size – from 1994 to 2009, the Inter-
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net has grown 300 times from millions of hosts to hundreds
of millions of hosts [4], while the Internet core routing ta-
ble size has only increased 15 times from 20,000 to 300,000
entries [17, 1].
Despite its importance, route aggregation is poorly un-
derstood. As will be discussed in Section 2, misconfigu-
ration and mis-use of route aggregation can lead to serious
routing anomalies such as persistent packet forwarding loop
and blackholes. Due to commercial and operational con-
siderations, ISPs usually do not disclose the details of rout-
ing anomaly incidents nor the router configuration files that
are needed to shed light on these incidents. This makes
it difficult to conduct a white-box analysis study to assess
how prevalent these routing anomalies are in practice and
to which extent route aggregation contributes to them. As
a consequence, researchers resort to blackbox measurement
methodologies to study routing anomalies. While this method-
ology can expose the anomalies in the wild, it is difficult to
identify the root cause of the anomalies observed. For ex-
ample, Xia et al. discovered a large number of persistent
forwarding loops in the Internet and conjectured that mis-
configuration with respect to route-aggregation capabilities
could be the root cause behind 50% of them [29]. Another
study reported that routing blackholes are prevalent in the
Internet but did not give specific reasons [19].
In this paper, we take the position that it is important to un-
derstand the risk that route aggregation poses to the correct
operation of routing systems. Given the practical difficul-
ties of a white-box analysis and limitations of the black-box
measurement methodology, we adopt the following method-
ology: We first study the route aggregation behavior as im-
plemented in today’s routers. The reason for this starting
point is that there has been no precise specification of the
route aggregation behaviors — RFC 1338 [14], which in-
troduced the concept of route aggregation, only gave a high
level goal and description. Many important questions re-
lated to route aggregation are left unanswered in RFCs. For
example, when should routers aggregate route information?
How is the aggregate prefix determined? On which inter-
faces should an aggregate be advertised? How is the met-
ric of an aggregate route decided? Subsequent RFCs [13,
24] did not clarify. In practice, the exact behaviors of route
aggregation are determined by the specific implementations
of route aggregation for different routing protocols and by
different vendors. As a second step, we propose a model
that allows us to analyze and reason about route aggrega-
tion, identify routing abnormalities that can be root-caused
to route aggregation, and design and prove more formal and
comprehensive guidelines to ensure safe routing in the pres-
ence of routing aggregation.
There are obvious limitations with our methodology: It
does not yield all the possible routing anomalies that may
occur because of route aggregation. Neither does it prove
that the identified anomalies are happening in the real world.
Despite these, our research based on this methodology has
yielded important insights for understanding route aggrega-
tion, studying routing anomalies, designing better practice
and guidelines for routing safety, and developing next gen-
eration routing protocols. In particular, we have made the
following contributions:
1. We conducted a set of experiments on route aggrega-
tion (RA) behaviors of all major routing protocols (BGP,
OSPF, EIRGP, RIP) as implemented by the two lead-
ing router vendors (Cisco and Juniper). Our experiments
show that the RA behaviors vary significantly across rout-
ing protocols and router vendors even for simple network
setups.
2. We propose two router level primitives and incorporate
them into a canonical router model. The new model cap-
tures the diversity of observed RA behaviors as imple-
mented by different vendors for different protocols.
3. With aid of the model, we have advanced the fundamen-
tal understanding of RA on three fronts. First, we ex-
pose four new types of routing anomaly that can result
from RA, including permanent route oscillation and un-
expected route loss. Furthermore, we identify the root
causes for each anomaly (new or previously known). Sec-
ond, we explain why the current vendor guidelines fall
short in addressing the anomalies. In addition, we es-
tablish that determining whether a network configuration
with route aggregations can result in persistent forward-
ing loops is NP-complete. Assuming that P is not equal
to NP, the problem is untractable. Therefore, we finally
present sufficient conditions for the RA primitives to guar-
antee routing safety. The conditions are independent of
routing protocols and work for both Cisco and Juniper
designs.
4. We explore and discuss clean-slate designs for RA. We
introduce the notion of negative routes to generalize the
concept of routes, and show how this new concept can
safely reduce the number of routing entries.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2
provides a brief overview of route aggregation, including
two known routing anomalies. Section 3 describes the ex-
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Figure 1: Route aggregation allows router Y to combine
multiple routes (10.1.1.0/24, ..., 10.1.255.0/24) into a single
one (10.1.0.0/16).
we observed from the experiments. In Section 4, we propose
two router primitives that captures the observed RA behav-
iors and a canonical router model for analyzing the behav-
iors. Section 5 focuses on new anomalies and an analysis
of their root causes. Then, in Sections 6 and 7, we explain
the limitations of current solutions and formulate new safety
conditions, respectively. Section 8 explores clean-slate de-
signs for RA. Section 9 briefly discusses related work, and
the paper concludes with Section 10.
2. BACKGROUND
Route aggregation (also commonly called route summa-
rization or supernetting) designates the method to supersede
a set of routes by a single more general route. To illustrate
this feature, we consider the network depicted in Figure 1.
We assume all routers to run a common routing protocol
(e.g., RIP or EIGRP). Every router Xi (1 ≤ i ≤ 255) is di-
rectly connected to an interface with IP prefix 10.1.i.0/24.
Consequently, router Y ’s routing table contains at least 255
entries corresponding to the network addresses 10.1.1.0/24,
10.1.2.0/24, ..., 10.1.255.0/24. Rather than advertising these
255 prefixes to router Z, route aggregation allows router
Y to combine all of them into a single destination prefix
10.1.0.0/16, and announce only one route to Z.
When a router is configured to advertise an aggregate route,
e.g., to destination prefix 10.1.0.0/16, it generates and adver-
tises the aggregate route upon knowing at least one route to a
more specific prefix, e.g., to 10.1.1.0/24. The more specific
prefix is referred to as a child prefix, and the corresponding
route a child or contributing route. Often in a network, some
child prefixes of an aggregate prefix are not allocated to any
subnets. Such child prefixes are commonly called unallo-
cated or unused child prefixes.
While the primary application of route aggregation is to
increase the Internet scalability by reducing routing table
sizes, route aggregation is also used by operators to fulfill
other requirements. For example, by restricting the scope of
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Route advertisement Forwarding paths to 128.2.3.1
Figure 2: A persistent forwarding loop because of default
route. Packets sent to the unallocated prefix 128.2.3.0/24
keep bouncing between X and Y .
are not propagated into the routing core. To illustrate, in Fig-
ure 1, let us assume that the interface connected to router X1
and corresponding to 10.1.1.0/24 flaps. This hardware fail-
ure causes the router to continuously announce that interface
alternately to be “up” and “down”. With route aggregation
deployed at router Y , such routing instabilities are hidden
from router Z.
It is well known in the operator community that mis-
configuration and mis-use of route aggregation may result
in route anomalies such as persistent forwarding loops and
blackholes.
Persistent forwarding loop for unallocated child pre-
fixes [28]. Consider the scenario depicted in Figure 2. The
enterprise network is allocated the address space 128.2.0.0/16.
Router Y advertises an aggregate route for that address range
to its ISP, which advertises the default route (i.e., 0.0.0.0/0)
– an aggregate route also – back to the enterprise network.
As an alternative, the enterprise network may be configured
with a static default route to its ISP [8]. Suppose only some
of the child prefixes of 128.2.0.0/16 (e.g., 128.2.1.0/24,
128.2.2.0/24, etc.) are allocated in the network. Now let’s
focus on an unallocated child prefix, 128.2.3.0/24. Packets
sent to this prefix and arriving at router X are forwarded to
router Y because of the aggregate route (128.2.0.0/16) ad-
vertised by Y . The traffic then reaches router Y which has
no specific route to the destination. Hence, Y uses the de-
fault route received from X and forwards the traffic back to
X , resulting in a persistent forwarding loop between routers
X and Y .
Although unallocated prefixes may not directly impact user
traffic, researchers have warned about attackers potentially
exploiting this type of forwarding loops to cause network
congestion [29].
To prevent this anomaly, operators commonly install a
sink route in the router. It is a route corresponding to the
aggregate address and pointing to the Null interface. Its goal






Route advertisement Forwarding paths to 10.1.2.0/24  
Figure 3: Illustration of a blackhole.
not a more specific route. For example, installing a static
route for 128.2.0.0/16 pointing to the Null interface at router
Y will prevent the above forwarding loop. Packets sent to
128.2.3.0/24 and reaching Y will not be sent back to X but
dropped at Y . A prior study [29] has hypothesized the lack
of sink routes (e.g., because of accidental omissions) to be
at the origin of observed loops in the Internet. In response,
router vendors have incorporated the feature of sink route
creation into their latest router software. However, as we
will show in Section 5, the current sink route solutions are
not sufficient.
Blackhole [28]. Consider the scenario of Figure 3. Routers
B and C are directly connected to two subnets: 10.1.2.0/24
and 10.1.3.0/24. Both routers are configured to advertise an
aggregate route for 10.1.2.0/23 to router A.
Suppose the interface ofB that connects to subnet 10.1.2.0/24
has just failed. Router B still announces the summary route
10.1.2.0/23 to routerA because it knows a child route 10.1.3.0/24.
As a result, router A receives two routes to 10.1.2.0/23, from
B and C, respectively. Since the two routes have identical
metrics, A may select B as its next-hop for packets sent to
10.1.2.0/24. However, upon arriving at B, these packets are
dropped as B does not have a route to 10.1.2.0/24.
To conclude, this scenario shows that route aggregation
can result in packets being blackholed despite the existence
of a valid path to the destinations (e.g., A-C). Installing a
sink route will not change the behavior.
3. CURRENT IMPLEMENTATIONS
Unlike most routing mechanisms (e.g., routing protocols),
there is no single standard or IETF Request For Comment
that precisely specifies the behaviors of route aggregation.
Instead, route aggregation was introduced in conjunction with
the Classless Inter-Domain Routing (CIDR) hierarchical ad-
dressing scheme, as a solution to (1) the exhaustion of IPv4
class B addresses, and (2) the explosion of routing table
sizes. RFC 1338 – the IETF RFC that instituted route aggre-
gation – only describes the main concept and general rules.
For instance, RFC 1338 explains the key objective of route
aggregation which essentially consists in aggregating the route
information and advertising a single route in lieu of sep-
arately announcing all the child prefixes. RFC 1338 also
defines several new rules: e.g., (1) forwarding must be per-
formed based on the longest prefix match algorithm, (2) pack-
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Figure 4: Setup for Experimenting with RA
ets that match an aggregate route but not any more specific
routes must be discarded.
However, many questions related to RA are left unan-
swered, such as: When should routers aggregate route in-
formation? How is the aggregate prefix determined? On
which interfaces should an aggregate be advertised? How is
the metric of an aggregate route decided?
In practice, the exact RA behaviors are determined by the
specific implementations of different routing protocols by
different vendors [3, 18, 9, 11]. To understand the common-
alities and differences among these implementations, we con-
duct a set of experiments over BGP, RIP, OSPF, and EIGRP
that are implemented by Cisco and Juniper. We use Cisco
2600 (running IOS version 12.3) and Juniper 4300 (running
JUNOS version 8.2R1.7) for our experiments.
3.1 Experiment Setup
Figure 4 depicts the setup for our experiments. Each ex-
periment usually involves three routers. The first router, X ,
serves to generate child routes. We vary the number of child
routes, the metrics of the child routes, their prefix lengths,
and the protocol where they are advertised. The second
router, Y , is the aggregating router. We configure it to per-
form route aggregation. We inspect Y ’s router FIB for the
existence of sink route, and vary the administrative distance
(AD) [10] of other running processes to determine the AD
value of the sink route. When multiple routing protocols ad-
vertise routes to the same prefix, the router selects the route
with the lowest AD value to install in its FIB [21]. Finally,
the third router, Z, allows us to verify the advertisement and
metric of the aggregate route. In a routing domain, a router
may receive a route it initially advertised. In other words,
the output of a router may impact its inputs. As such, we
re-inject the aggregate route back to X .
3.2 Findings
Table 1 presents the summary of our findings. At the high
level, the RA exhibits diverse behaviors on three aspects:
modes of route aggregation, metric of aggregate route, and
sink routes.
Modes of Route Aggregation: We find that there actually
exists two main modes of route aggregation: Auto-Summary
and manual aggregation, and that the latter can be further
divided into several sub-classes: interface, area/level, BGP
AS, instance, and router-based manual aggregation. For all
of them, the presence of a child route is a necessary and suf-
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Figure 5: RA configuration for Juniper.
route. However, each type presents distinct characteristics:1
Interface. This mode of route aggregation allows routing
processes to advertise an explicitly configured aggregate route,
instead of the child routes, out of specific interfaces.
Area/Level. Link-state routing protocols flood link state in-
formation (not routes) to all participating routing processes.
However, OSPF and IS-IS also offer the notion of areas,
and levels respectively, to allow hierarchical designs, and be-
tween areas/levels, routes are exchanged in a vectoring man-
ner and hence can be aggregated.
Router/Instance. For Juniper routers, route aggregation is
configured in a consistent way for all routing protocols. The
configuration consists of three steps (Figure 5): The first one
(lines 1 to 5), begins with a routing-options statement, and
creates a sink route. Then, a policy-options statement (lines
6 to 13) defines the export policies for the sink route. Fi-
nally, the export rules are applied to the protocols (lines 15
to 18) where the sink route is to be advertised. A child route
must be present in the FIB for a sink route to become valid
and to be considered by the route selection procedure. The
creation of the sink route is therefore per router, while the
advertisement is per routing instance.
Metric of Aggregate Route: The metric of the aggregate
route is determined in a variety of ways. It is set to the mini-
mum or maximum of all the child prefixes depending on the
routing protocol and vendor. We note that for many imple-
mentations (e.g., Cisco RIP, Cisco EIGRP), the method the
metric of the aggregate route is computed cannot be mod-
ified. For BGP, route advertisements include an AS-PATH
attribute, which is an ordered sequence of the autonomous
systems the route has traversed. For Cisco routers, the AS-
PATH of aggregate routes is by default reset to the aggregat-
ing network. However, optionally, a router can also include
an AS-SET attribute which indicates the autonomous sys-
tems where the child prefixes came from.
1The auto-summary and BGP-AS modes are described in [23].
Vendor Routing Modes of Route Aggregation Metric of Sink RouteProtocol Auto-Summary Manual Aggregate Route Auto-Creation Default AD
Cisco
EIGRP Yes Per Interface min() Yes 5
RIP Yes Per Interface min() No N/A
OSPF No Per Area min(), later max() Yes 110
BGP Yes Per AS Origin/AS-SET Yes 200
Juniper * No Creation Per Router Customizable Yes 130Advertisement Per Instance
Table 1: Characterization of Route Aggregation behaviors.
Sink Route: Most implementations automatically create a
sink route upon advertising an aggregate route. However, the
default AD value of an aggregate route may be higher than
that of routing protocols. For example, for Juniper, the ad-
ministrative distance value of aggregate routes is by default
130. In contrast, the default administrative distance values
of internal OSPF routes, IS-IS Level 1 internal routes, IS-IS
Level 2 internal routes and RIP are respectively 10, 15, 18
and 100. As such, the sink routes may not get installed in
a router’s FIB. Finally, we note that certain implementation
(e.g., Cisco RIP) neither creates any sink route nor offers a
mean for operators to install one.
4. A MODEL FOR ROUTE AGGREGATION
The previous section revealed the ad-hoc nature of the cur-
rent design and implementations of route aggregation (RA).
The results motivated us to develop an analytical model to
reason about RA, starting from the hypothesis that the func-
tionality can be succinctly defined by a small number of sim-
ple functions and their interactions with other routing com-
ponents of a router. Furthermore, prior work has attributed
RA to routing anomalies such as forwarding loops [29] and
blackholes [28]. A unified model of route aggregation, by
abstracting away many of the implementation details, would
also help identify the real root causes of these anomalies.
In this section, we present such a unified analytical model.
First, we introduce two router level RA specific primitives
and incorporate them into a canonical router model. The ob-
served diverse RA behaviors can be captured entirely by the
action of these simple primitives and their interaction with
other routing components on the same router. Then, we il-
lustrate how the model may be used to predict the router FIB
content and the route advertisements at each router.
4.1 Route Aggregation Primitives
Based on the experimental results, we observe that the
essence of route aggregation lies in two software primitives
which we term add-sink() and adv-aggr(). Cisco implemen-
tations rely on both while Juniper implementations use only
the first primitive.
4.1.1 add-sink()
The add-sink() primitive takes two input arguments and
outputs a set of sink routes to the route selection procedure.
Primitive 1 add-sink(E, A)
Input: (1) E - routes from the router FIB or
routes from a protocol specific Route Information Base
(RIB); (2) A - all aggregate routes configured on the
router
1: S = {}
2: Remove existing sink routes from E
3: for all a ∈ A do
4: if there exists a child route of a in E then
5: Set AD value and Null next hop for a;
6: Add a to S;
7: end if
8: end for
9: Present S to the route selection procedure
The first argument E is a set of routes present at the router.
However, depending on the implementations, this set may
correspond to the routes in either the FIB (for JUNOS), or a
protocol specific routing information base (RIB) (for Cisco).
The second argument A is the set of all aggregate routes that
are configured on the router.
The add-sink() primitive embodies two key characteris-
tics. First, while all vendor implementations except Cisco
RIP create a sink route upon knowing a child route of a
configured aggregate route, not every sink route created is
installed in the FIB. Each sink route, upon creation, is as-
signed its own administrative distance (AD) value (Table 1)
– e.g., sink routes created from an EIGRP routing process
is set a default AD value of 5. Inside the route selection
procedure, the sink route will compete with other routes to
the same prefix that may be offered by different routing pro-
cesses (e.g., OSPF, BGP, or static), and unless the sink route
has the lowest AD value in the group, it will not be installed
in the FIB.
Second, the location where the primitive examines for the
presence of child routes differs depending on the implemen-
tation. As explained in Section 3, for Juniper routers, the
creation of sink route is per router and the presence of a child
route in the FIB is a necessary and sufficient condition for a
sink route to be created. In contrast, we discovered that the
presence of child routes in the FIB is not a sufficient con-
dition for Cisco routers [23]. The sink route is created and
present only when a child route is present in the RIBout.










































Figure 6: Per-router model of RA in Cisco. The essence of RA lies in two main primitives add-sink() and adv-aggr(). Both
primitives are applied to the RIBout/RIB of the routing processes. add-sink() is not implemented for RIP. The router model for
Juniper implementations is provided in [23]: Specifically, add-sink() takes input from only the router FIB, and adv-aggr() is
not implemented. Instead, the router relies on route redistribution to advertise the aggregate routes.
Primitive 2 adv-aggr(E, A)
Input: (1) E - routes from a protocol specific RIBout;
(2) A - all aggregate routes configured on given inter-
face
1: Remove sink routes from E
2: for all a ∈ A do
3: if there exists a child route of a in E then
4: Remove all child routes of a in E;
5: a.m = metric(a,E);
6: Add a to E;
7: end if
8: end for
9: Advertise E on the interface
4.1.2 adv-aggr()
The second primitive, adv-aggr() handles the advertise-
ment of aggregate routes to the router’s peers. JUNOS im-
plementations rely on export policies to announce the aggre-
gate routes from the FIB into the routing processes. (See
Section 3.) As such, JUNOS routers simply rely on route
redistribution [21] to advertise the aggregate routes. In con-
trast, Cisco implementations depend on a separate primitive
that we call adv-aggr().
As highlighted in Section 3, operators may configure dif-
ferent aggregate routes on different interfaces. Consequently,
adv-aggr() is performed for each interface and per routing
process. The primitive takes two input arguments: E, the set
of routes present in a RIBout – the part of a RIB for storing
routes to be advertised out, andA, the set of aggregate routes
configured on a given interface. It determines and advertises
a set of aggregate routes on that interface.
To determine the set of routes to advertise, adv-aggr()
first removes all sink routes from E. It then goes through
all the aggregate routes configured on the interface, deter-
mines a subset with a least one child route included in E,
and advertises this subset of aggregate routes on the inter-
face. The metric of the advertised aggregate routes is set by
the metric() function, which is routing process specific. (See
Table 1.) For example, metric(a, E) returns, for OSPF, the
maximal metric of all a’s child routes in E.
4.2 Canonical Router Model
A prior study [22] has proposed a canonical router model
to study route selection and route redistribution (RR), the
procedures that govern how a router ranks and exchanges
routes received from different routing protocol processes.
We have successfully incorporated the new route aggrega-
tion primitives into the router model. Figure 6 depicts the
extended model for Cisco inplementations.
The new router model allows us to reason about how the
route aggregation primitives interact with a router’s other
routing components to impact the content of the router FIB,
and thus influence, directly, how packets are routed at the
router. In particular, we note that the large diversity of ob-
served RA behaviors can be explained by the differences in
where the primitives add-sink() and adv-aggr() are applied
in different implementations. For brevity, we defer the de-
tails to a companion technical report [23].
4.3 Router FIB Prediction
The canonical router model allows us to infer whether a
route is in the FIB and how it may be advertised at a router,
by tracing the steps of the route moving through the router.
Using this methodology, we have discovered a surprising
and counterintuitive result as follows.
Unexpected route loss: Configuration of route aggregation
on an interface can prevent the advertisements of routes on
other interfaces.
To illustrate it, we hypothesize a Cisco router running
EIGRP on four interfaces I1, I2, I3 and I4. We assume
that the router receives only two routes: r1 and r2 to des-
tination prefixes 192.168.1.0/24 and 192.168.0.0/16, respec-
tively on interface I1. Furthermore, we assume that an ag-
gregate route r3 to 192.168.0.0/16 is configured on I2 and
another aggregate route r4 to 192.0.0.0/8 is configured on
I3. As illustrated in Figure 7, the interaction of these routes
would produce the following sequence of events:
r1 r1 r1
r2
r1 r1 r1 r1
r2
r1 r1 r1












































































Figure 7: Configuration of aggregate routes on interfaces I2
and I3 impacts the announcements on interface I4. Although
the router receives two routes r1, r2 to different prefixes,
only one of the routes (r1) is advertised on I4.
t1 The two received routes, r1 and r2, are installed in the
FIB and the EIGRP RIBout.
t2 Then, after executing add-sink({r1, r2}, {r3, r4}), the out-
put {r3, r4} is presented to the route selection procedure.
t3 Because r3 has an AD value of 5 whereas r2 has an AD
value of 90, r3 is preferred and installed in the FIB, serv-
ing as a sink route. As for r4, it is the only route to
192.0.0.0/8 and is therefore also installed in the FIB.
The EIGRP RIBout is updated. r2 is removed, while r3
and r4 are added. add-sink({r1, r3, r4}, {r3, r4}) is exe-
cuted, passing {r3, r4} to the route selection procedure.
t4 adv-aggr() is performed for each interface.
For I2, adv-aggr({r1, r3, r4}, {r3}) returns r3. As such,
r3 is advertised out on I2.
For I3, adv-aggr({r1, r3, r4}, {r4}) returns r4. Finally,
on I4, adv-aggr({r1, r3, r4}, {}) returns r1.
While the advertisements on interfaces I2 and I3 are as
expected, the announcements on I4 is surprising. No route
aggregation is configured on I4. When the router receives
two routes r1 and r2 to different prefixes, one may expect
both routes to be advertised out of I4. However, it turns
out that only r1 is announced. r2 has been “filtered out”
and is lost.
We implemented the above scenario with actual Cisco routers
and confirmed the route loss.
5. ANOMALIES AND ROOT CAUSES
Using the new model of route aggregation, we have per-
formed an in-depth analysis of routing anomalies that may
result from route aggregation. We already described one of
the results, i.e., unexpected route loss, in the previous sec-
tion. In this section, we present the other key results from
the analysis. First, we identify the root causes for the known
anomalies, namely forwarding loops and blackholes. Then,
we disclose three new additional routing anomalies that may
occur with route aggregation and analyze their root causes.
Table 2 contains a quick summary of our results on routing
anomalies.
Our main finding is that the current design of sink route
creation does not guarantee the installation of the sink route
in the FIB, i.e., the sink route is created but has no effect.
This may give a false sense of safety. In addition, sink routes
do not mean anomaly-free routing: we showed that sink
route can also cause route loss.
Our methodology has two major elements. The first is a
step by step simulation of the creation and movement of ag-
gregate and sink routes, with the aid of the canonical router
model. The other is leveraging the recently proposed Metarout-
ing theory [16]. As described in Section 3, route aggregation
is relevant and can happen only when routes are iteratively
advertised router by router, as with vector routing protocols.
For such protocols, the Metarouting theory establishes that
strict monotonicity (SM) is a sufficient condition for conver-
gence to loop-free paths [16]. Put it simply, the SM property
stipulates that a route’s preference should strictly decrease
when propagated in the network. Therefore, we specifically
looked for scenarios that may violate the SM condition when
looking for new anomalies.
Our goal is not to enumerate all the possible routing anoma-
lies that could be caused by route aggregation. Neither do we
have evidence that these anomalies are happening in the real
world. Despite these, we believe our findings would provide
important insights for studying routing anomalies, develop-
ing better practice and guidelines to ensure routing safety,
and designing next generation routing mechanisms that are
more robust and safe.
5.1 Root Causes of Known Anomalies
Forwarding loops for unallocated child prefixes. Re-
call that a scenario exhibiting this anomaly was illustrated
in Figure 2. It involves a route aggregation implementation
(Cisco RIP) that does not implement the add-sink() primi-
tive. Without a sink route, a router may advertise an aggre-
gate route with “holes”, i.e., the router FIB has no entries
for all the unallocated child prefixes. Consequently, when
receiving packets destined to those prefixes, the router may
return them back to the previous hop (e.g., because of the
default route in the example scenario), causing a persistent
forwarding loop.
We note that advertising an aggregate route without a sink
route effectively propagates nonexistent routes for the un-
Anomaly Status Root Cause
Forwarding Loop
(unallocated prefixes)
Previously known No sink route is created; or sink route fails to install in the FIB.
Blackhole Previously known Advertisement of a child prefix without a route other than the sink route.
Forwarding Loop
(allocated prefixes)
Newly discovered No sink route is created; or sink route fails to install in the FIB.
Route Oscillation
with Count-to-Infinity
Newly discovered Interaction between multiple aggregating routers that fail to install a sink route in the FIB.
Count-to-Infinity
(perpetual)
Newly discovered No sink route is created; or sink route fails to install in the FIB.
Route Loss Newly discovered Sink route overriding another valid route for the same aggregate prefix.
Table 2: Summary of Possible Routing Anomalies from Current Design of Route Aggregation.
used prefixes. Nonexistent routes should be the least pre-
ferred in the network. Propagating them is certainly a viola-
tion of the SM condition. A corollary of this conclusion is
that this category of anomalies may be wider because even
with add-sink() implemented, not every sink route generated
is installed in the FIB; as described in the previous section,
each sink route needs to compete with routes from other
routing processes based on the AD value. We substantiate
this corollary later in the section.
Blackholes for some child prefixes. Recall that a sce-
nario for this anomaly was illustrated in Figure 3. This prob-
lem occurs partly because of the introduction of sink routes.
When a router advertises an aggregate route with “holes”,
packets destined for one of the locally unknown child pre-
fixes may arrive unexpectedly and as a result, get discarded
due to the sink route. If that child prefix is unallocated
throughout the entire network, the router in fact does the
right thing: Packets to unallocated prefixes should be dropped
as soon as possible. However, if the child prefix is allocated
but just unknown to this particular router (e.g., because of
failures), we have a blackhole. Therefore, the occurrence
of blackhole is also largely due to an event happening on
another router: the advertised aggregate route is mistakenly
preferred over all routes that point to a legitimate forward-
ing path to that allocated child prefix. Since the root cause
involves multiple routes, the SM condition does not apply
here. In this way, blackholes may be more difficult to detect
and prevent than other anomalies.
5.2 New Anomalies
Our analysis has uncovered a total of four new types of
routing anomalies. We validated all the presented anomalies
in our test bed, with the exception of the count-to-infinity of
arbitrary time length as this anomaly requires specific race
conditions that are difficult to produce in our environment.
One of the the anomalies was already presented in Sec-
tion 4. The remaining three anomalies fall into two groups
based on their root cause. The first group of anomalies is
caused by the absence of a sink route in the FIB of a single
router. The other class results from the interaction between
multiple routers that advertise the same aggregate route. We







Figure 8: Illustration of perpetual count-to-infinity.
Cisco and Juniper routers, with default settings for routing
protocols. Therefore, we believe there is a good chance they
will happen in practice.
5.2.1 Absence of Sink Route in One Router FIB
As discussed in Section 4, there are two cases where a sink
route is not installed in the router FIB. First, some vendor
implementations do not implement the add-sink() primitive,
and thus do not install a sink route. Second, a sink route may
be assigned an AD value that is larger than that of another
route learned by a routing process, and thus is not chosen by
the route selection procedure. Below, we show a new rout-
ing anomaly that is a consequence of the latter case.
Perpetual Count-to-Infinity. Consider the network de-
picted in Figure 8. Enterprise networks are usually designed
according to a hierarchical structure with a core connecting
all access networks. Access networks commonly have a hub
and spoke topology, whereas the core may consist of a ring
to a full mesh depending on the financial constrainsts and
resiliency requirements. We assume router B to run JUNOS
and to be configured to advertise via RIP an aggregate route
for 10.2.0.0/16 out of its interface to routerC. The following
events lead to a perpetual count to infinity problem.
t1 RouterA has a directly connected subnet 10.2.1.0/24, and
advertises this prefix to B.
t2 Router B receives the announcement from A and installs
a route to 10.2.1.0/24 in its router FIB. Then, as this route
is a child route of 10.2.0.0/16, B advertises an aggregate
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Figure 9: Route oscillations.
route for 10.2.0.0/16 to router C, with a metric value of 1.
t3 The route gets propagated and comes back to router B,
from router D, with a metric value of 4. In scenarios
where this route has a lower AD value than the sink route,
which is the case with JUNOS default setups (100 for
RIP routes vs. 130 for a sink route), the route selection
procedure prefers it and installs it in the FIB in place of
the original sink route. Since the route to 10.2.0.0/16 (at
router B) now has a metric value of 4, B sends a new
advertisement to C with a metric value of 5.
The advertisement cycle continues and the metric of this
route keeps incrementing until it reaches the maximum al-
lowed value. The route is then discarded, a sink route is in-
stalled in the FIB again, and the whole process repeats. We
have a perpetual count-to-infinity problem. This anomaly is
particularly undesirable because the network is permanently
unstable.
5.2.2 Interaction of Multiple Aggregating Routers
Route oscillations may derive from the interaction of mul-
tiple aggregating routes which creates a race condition sim-
ilar to that of a BGP dispute wheel [15]. In addition, our
analysis reveals that route aggregation can cause persistent
forwarding loops for allocated child prefixes, not just for un-
allocated child prefixes as described in Section 2. Because
of space limitations, we only present the route oscillations.
For the forwarding loops for allocated addresses, we refer
the reader to [23].
Route oscillation with count-to-infinity. Consider the
network depicted in Figure 9. For added resiliency, access
networks are frequently connected to the core through mul-
tiple border routers. Routers X and Y are Juniper routers.
The configuration is such that routers X and Y both adver-
tise an aggregate route for 10.1.0.0/16 with the same metric
values. The following sequence of events leads to route os-
cillations.
t1 Routers X and Y both advertise the aggregate route and
at the same time, create a sink route. Because the sink
route is the only available route to 10.1.0.0/16, the sink
route is installed in each router’s FIB.
t2 RouterX receives the aggregate route advertised by router
Y . X now has two routes to 10.1.0.0/16: the local sink
route, and the route received from Y .
For scenarios where the route received from Y is more
preferred to the local sink route (because of their AD
value assignments), the sink route is removed from the
FIB. As a result, router X stops advertising the aggregate
route and instead, re-advertises the route from Y after in-
crementing its metric. Router Y may concurrently per-
form the same actions, preferring the route from X to the
destination 10.1.0.0/16, and re-advertising it with a larger
metric value.
t3 If X and Y are synchronized in processing their routing
information, the following cycle repeats at each router:
receiving a route with a larger metric value than the route
in its FIB, updating its FIB with the new route, and re-
advertising the new route after incrementing the metric.
It ends when the maximum metric value is reached. The
two routes are then withdrawn, and the network is back
to the same state as at t1.
We obtain a route oscillation in which routers X and Y
periodically switch back to the sink route for a short pe-
riod and for the rest of the time, keep selecting and ad-
vertising each other’s route in a count-to-infinity fashion.
The anomaly may last for an arbitrary amount of time,
until the synchronization between X and Y stops.
Interestingly, if Cisco routers were used for X and Y ,
there would be a persistent forwarding loop for unallocated
child prefixes. This is because the Cisco specific adv-aggr()
primitive would advertise an aggregate route with the same
metric value (i.e., minimal metric of all child routes) as long
as the child route is in the RIBout. So at step t2, both X
and Y would still advertise an aggregate route with the same
metric value as at t1. There is no count-to-infinity problem.
However, because the sink routes are squeezed out of the
router FIBs, we have a persistent forwarding loops for unal-
located child prefixes.
6. ANALYSIS OF EXISTING SOLUTIONS
Router vendors have proposed several guidelines to deal
with the known anomalies caused by route aggregation. In
this section, we explain why they fall short in solving the
problem. Furthermore, we show that it is not always pos-
sible to detect anomalies early, by statically checking route
configurations alone. These negative results indicate the lim-
itation of patchy solutions, and they have motivated us to for-
mulate conditions on the intrinsic behaviors of the two route
aggregation primitives that can guarantee anomaly-free rout-
ing regardless of configuration. (We will present the condi-
tions in Section 7.)
6.1 Inadequacy of Vendor Guidelines
Installation of sink routes. The most widely-known ven-
dor guideline is the one stipulated by RFC 4632 [13], which
defines the following rule for routers performing route ag-
gregation:
A router that generates an aggregate route for multiple,
more-specific routes must discard packets that match the ag-
gregate route, but not any of the more-specific routes. In
other words, the "next hop" for the aggregate route should
be the null destination. This is necessary to prevent forward-
ing loops when some addresses covered by the aggregate are
not reachable.
This rule makes sense as a correctness criterion for route
aggregation behaviors. How to meet the criterion is far from
straightforward. For example, an early version of the RFC [14]
suggested to create sink routes. However, the creation of a
sink route alone does not guarantee the route to be active,
i.e., included in the router FIB, as illustrated in the scenarios
presented in Section 5. Moreover, the installation of a sink
route at a router may create a blackhole for some child pre-
fixes that are valid even though they are not explicitly known
at that particular router.
Topology specific guidelines. Cisco documentation [2]
describes multiple scenarios where blackholes may result
from route aggregation, and suggests two main approaches
to address the issue. Both approaches require a specific topol-
ogy to work. The first is based on adding a physical link be-
tween two aggregating routers that are gateways of a com-
mon child prefix (e.g., routerB andC in Figure 3.) Doing so
would allow one gateway, after losing its direct connection
to the child prefix, to learn a route to that prefix from the
other gateway, thus preventing the blackhole. The second
approach places an even stronger restriction on the network
topology, only permitting route aggregation by a router that
is the only exit point (i.e., a choke point) between two seg-
ments of the network.
6.2 Difficulty of Early Detection of Anomalies
Given the limitation of the vendor guidelines, a natural
question arises: Is it possible to detect anomalies early us-
ing static analysis techniques that have proven effective in
several areas of software development. Unfortunately, the
answer to this question is not a positive one.
Theorem 1: The problem of determining whether the col-
lection of route aggregation configurations in a network is
vulnerable to persistent forwarding loops is NP-complete.
The proof mainly relies on a polynomial reduction of the
the well known NP-complete problem of 3-CNF SAT. The
details are omitted because of space limitations, but can be
found in [23].
7. NEW SAFETY CONDITIONS
So far, we have exposed a slew of problems with the cur-
rent route aggregation design and the difficulties of address-
ing these problems without changing the behavior of the
primitives. In the following two sections, we look beyond
the current design and explore alternative approaches. Ide-
ally, a new design should satisfy all these four safety proper-
ties: (1) Convergence (i.e., no route oscillations), (2) Loop-
free packet forwarding paths, (3) No blackholes, and (4) No
unexpected route losses.
In the first alternative approach, we focus on modifying
just the behavior of the add-sink() and adv-aggr() primitives.
Specifically, we formulate a set of safety conditions on their
new behavior.
It has proven a challenge to formulate one set of condi-
tions for the primitives to guarantee all four properties. The
challenge lies in the fact that the prevention of some of the
anomalies like blackholes may require either (i) network-
wide coordination among the routers in addition to a new
design of the primitives, or (ii) a very stringent requirement
on when a router can advertise an aggregate route. Also, the
conditions should be general, independent of routing proto-
cols, router vendor architectures, and the network topology.
As a result, the conditions presented below may be too strin-
gent to meet some of the existing design goals.
7.1 Convergence to Loop-Free Paths
Condition 1. For an aggregate prefix, a sink route is added
and always possesses the lowest unique AD value.
Condition 1 is sufficient to guarantee convergence and
loop-free forwarding paths because it preserves the strictly
monotonic (SM) property [16]. When a sink route is present
and always has the lowest AD value, it is preferred to the
advertised aggregate route, ensuring the preservation of SM.
Due to space limitations, a detailed proof of the correct-
ness of this condition, which can be found in [23], is omit-
ted.
7.2 Blackhole Prevention
Condition 2. A router advertises an aggregate route only if
a set of routes that fully covers the address space of the ag-
gregate route is present in the FIB.
Condition 2 guarantees not only convergence and loop-
free forwarding paths, but also the absence of blackholes.
The first part can be proven through the preservation of the
SM propery, while the blackhole prevention part can be demon-
strated by contradiction. The details can be found in [23].
This condition directly addresses the problem illustrated
in Figure 3: Compliance with Condition 2 ensures that router
B will stop advertising the aggregate route and announce a
route to 10.1.3.0/24 instead when it no longer has a route
to subnet 10.1.2.0/24. Consequently, router A will forward
all packets destined to that subnet only to router C, and
there will be no chance for the packets to be blackholed at
router B.
We note that router C can still advertise the aggregate
route. In addition, for a network with a hierarchical routing
design structure as recommended by vendors [26], routers in
a higher tier (e.g., router A in Figure 3) may still be able to
advertise aggregate routes. Clearly, further empirical studies
of both intra-domain and inter-domain topologies are needed
to validate the hierarchical structure of the Internet, and as-
sess whether this condition may be too stringent in practice.
Section 8 describes an alternative design for route aggre-
gation that eliminates blackholes without requiring Condi-
tion 2.
7.3 Prevention of Route Loss
Condition 3. add-sink() and adv-aggr() should not create a
new route in the presence of another route in the router FIB
advertising the same prefix as the aggregate.
Condition 3 eliminates the type of route losses identified
in Section 4, and can be combined with either Condition 1
or Condition 2. If add-sink() and adv-aggr() create no new
route, the route that was lost before now has no competition,
and therefore continues to stay in the FIB and be advertised.
(Again, the details of the proof can be found in [23].) Note
that adv-aggr() should still suppress child routes of the ag-
gregate prefix in this case.
8. A CLEAN SLATE APPROACH
In this section, we no longer restrict ourselves to the ex-
isting primitives but explore a bolder design alternative for
route aggregation. First, we revisit the role and the funda-
mental semantics of route aggregation.
Route aggregation reduces the storage requirements for
the forwarding tables by leveraging the hierarchical struc-
ture of IP addressing and allowing routers to treat multiple
destination networks collectively as a single logical destina-
tion.
However, while a route implies all destinations included
in the advertised prefix to be reachable, the current design
of route aggregation violates this assumption. As shown in
Sections 2 and 5, an aggregate route may include sub-blocks
of addresses that are not reachable. This inconsistency be-
tween views of the control and data planes may be the ulti-
mate culprit of the routing anomalies and blackholes.
Therefore, to mitigate all the problems, we introduce the
novel concept of negative route. In particular, routers must
advertise and store in their forwarding table, in conjunction
of an aggregate route, child prefixes for which they do not
have a route.
In relation to the results of the previous section, the use
of negative routes would make Condition 2 unnecessary. A
router no longer requires all child prefixes to be present in
order to advertise an aggregate route. Instead, routers will
use negative routes to precisely define the prefixes for which
they have a valid route. Consequently, other routers can then
select only valid routes to target destinations.
To illustrate it, we assume a network making use of the
192.168.0.0/16 block of IP addresses: A router that can reach
all the /24 child prefixes has advertised a single prefix
192.168.0.0/16. Suppose that due to a link failure, one child
prefix 192.168.255.0/24 becomes unreachable. Condition 2
requires a new set of aggregate routes to be computed as
follows. All remaining reachable /24 child prefixes will be
merged into maximal sized blocks with a common prefix.
As such, in the absence of negative routes, in order to com-
ply with Condition 2, the router has to advertise 8 prefixes:
192.168.0/17, 192.168.128/18, 192.168.192/19, 192.168.224
/20, 192.168.240/21, 192.168.248/22, 192.168.252/23,
192.168.254/24. In contrast, with the capability of negative
routes, that router would only handle two routes: 192.168.0/16
(aggregate) and 192.168.255/24 (negative).
Two prior proposals have semblance of negative routes.
First, routers currently advertise invalid routes (e.g., RIP route
with a distance of 16) but the goal of such routes is only to
withdraw previously advertised routes. Upon receiving an
invalid route, a router removes the route if it is present in
the routing table. In contrast, our notion of negative route
has stronger semantics than that of an invalid route. A neg-
ative route should be stored in a router’s routing table, and
taken into consideration when selecting a best route for a
destination. Doing so eliminates all routing anomalies due
to unreachable sub-prefixes in an aggregate route.
The other related proposal is the IS-IS Detailed IP Reach-
ability Extension [12], which suggests route advertisements
to be accompanied by a bit vector. Each bit represents the
reachability to one address in the range of addresses covered
by the route. As such, a router could learn the exact “holes”
in a summary address. However, the extension was designed
to solve a different problem: that of the reachability of BGP
next hops for the BGP next hop tracking feature. As such,
[12] specifically stipulates that: “the information present in
the detailed reachability sub-TLV should not be used to gen-
erate any dataplane forwarding entry.”
In other words, the proposal does not address the afore-
mentioned inconsistency between the control and data planes.
To illustrate this shortcoming, let us revisit the blackhole
problem depicted in Figure 3. Suppose that router B has
lost its connection to 10.1.2/24, and indicated this change to
router A through the bit vector method. As recommended
by router vendors [26], router A, being in a higher tier, may
advertise only the default route to routers B and C. In that
case, C will not be able to react to what has happened at
B, e.g., by advertising a more specific route to 10.1.2/24.
Further, since A does not adjust its forwarding table based
on the bit vector advertised by B, it will still send pack-
ets destined to 10.1.2/24 to B, resulting in a blackhole. In
contrast, by allowing routers to advertise and store negative
routes, our proposal ensures a consistent and accurate view
of reachable destinations at each router.
Finally, this approach may also enable new TE techniques
for multi-homed networks. We defer this topic, as well as
an analysis of the required modifications to the routing table
structures and the route selection logic, to future work.
9. RELATED WORK
The IRTF Routing Research Group [5] has been examin-
ing a number of long term proposals to improve the scalabil-
ity of the Internet routing system. The proposals can be clas-
sified into two main approaches: separation or elimination.
Both approaches require significant modifications to the ex-
isting infrastructure. Separation based schemes (e.g., [27])
rely on a new mapping infrastructure. Elimination based
proposals (e.g., [7]) require major changes to end systems.
In addition, routing paradigms such as compact routing [20]
have been introduced to minimize the memory requirement
for storing routing information. In comparison to these pro-
posals, our main focus is to expose the risks of the current
route aggregation design and explore less disruptive solu-
tions that do not require major changes to existing routing
protocols or end systems.
Several short term proposals [30, 6] focus on reducing
the size requirement of a router FIB. While they may im-
prove router performance, they have a limited impact on how
routes are advertised by routing protocols and as such, they
do not address anomalies that can result from route aggrega-
tion, which is often used for privacy reasons too.
10. CONCLUSION
We make several contributions in this paper. First, we
perform a study and show that the RA behaviors vary signif-
icantly across routing protocols and router vendors even for
simple network setups. We then present a model that cap-
tures the diverse RA behaviors as in today’s router imple-
mentation and the interactions between router aggregation
and other functional blocks in a router. The model enables
us to perform a number of analysis for a single router and a
network of routers. We show that existing RA configuration
guidelines do not guarantee safety. For example, configura-
tion of sink routes is a key recommendation for avoiding per-
sistent routing loops with RA and a previous study assumes
that the persistent routing loops observed was due to lack of
configuration of sink route. However, we show that configu-
ration of sink routes may not result in the installation of sink
routes in the FIB and may also cause unexpected route loss.
Our analysis also finds that RA is tightly intertwined with
other essential functional components of a router (e.g., route
selection, route redistribution), and these complex interac-
tions can lead to unexpected outcomes. We further prove
that determining whether a network configuration with route
aggregation can result in a persistent forwarding loop is NP-
complete. Finally, we identify a set of sufficient conditions
to guarantee routing safety, and explore clean-slate designs
for this fundamental primitive.
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